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Keeping it Real: Literary Impersonality under Neoliberalism 
 
 
In 1956, the German critic Hugo Friedrich identified a list of common attributes 
used to describe modernist poetry.1 Derived from French, German, Spanish, 
and English critical traditions, it reads like a summa of the ideology of 
modernism: “disorientation, disintegration of the familiar, loss of order, 
fragmentism, reversibility … brutal abruptness, dislocation, astigmatism, 
alienation” (Friedrich 1956: 22).2 The problem with this list, as Friedrich himself 
was well aware (1956: 19ff.), is that it describes modernism in a purely negative 
fashion. Modernism becomes a singular tale of loss and deprivation rather than 
a productive, politically heterogeneous phenomenon. The task would thus seem 
to be to rewrite certain modernist categories in a manner that foregrounds their 
productive originality and revolutionary or counter-revolutionary potential. 
Fredric Jameson has attempted to do just this with one of Hugo Friedrich’s 
central critical categories: Entpersönlichung or “depersonalisation.”3 Where for 
Friedrich depersonalisation is the subjective correlate of a condition of 
alienation in which human praxis and creativity is systematically constrained, for 
Jameson it is a literary figuration of early twentieth-century revolutionary forces: 
a “longing … for some new existence outside the self, in a world radically 
transformed and worthy of ecstasy” (2002: 136). This would suggest that 
depersonalisation is a more politically ambiguous phenomenon than its 
habitually negative connotation might imply. 
Differently from both Jameson and Friedrich, however, I understand 
depersonalisation as part of a broader phenomenon of “impersonality” inherent 
in the capitalist world-system as such. That is, I take modernist depersonalisation 
to be but one variation of a larger socio-cultural process of impersonality that 
unfolds across the longue durée of capitalist modernity, and whose forms and 
valences mutate depending upon the historical and geo-political context. Such 
impersonality has many modalities – e.g., real abstraction (Toscano 2008; Finelli 
1987; Sohn-Rethel 1978), reification (Lukács 1971; Chanson, Cukier & 
Monferrand 2014), alienation (Fischbach 2016) – but fundamentally it consists 
                                               
1 I am grateful to Stephen Shapiro for his comments on a previous version of this article. All 
remaining errors are my own. 
2 The translation is taken from Friedrich (1974: 8-9). 
3 Jameson mistakenly transcribes Friedrich’s term as “Entpersonalisierung” (2002: 131). 
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in the fact that capitalism effects a systematic rupture with all traditional figures 
of the social bond (cf. Badiou 1999: 55), replacing them with the “cash nexus” 
or what Marx calls the “silent compulsion of economic relations” (Marx 1976: 
899). In certain strands of the secondary literature this “silent compulsion” has 
become known as “impersonal domination” (e.g., Postone 1993; Heinrich 
2012). Compared to previous modes of production, capital’s mode of 
domination is said to be impersonal rather than personal; as Ellen Meiksins 
Wood has written, “it is the ‘autonomous’ laws of the economy and capital ‘in 
the abstract’ that exercise power, not the capitalist wilfully imposing his personal 
authority upon labour” (1995: 41). Wood thus argues that there exists a 
“structural indifference of capitalism to extra-economic identities” (ibid.: 267). 
 The problem with this position is that it tends to downplay the extent to 
which “impersonal domination” is simultaneously impersonal and personalising.4 
The present article argues that the impersonality of historical capitalism is best 
conceived as an uneven, often violent, combination of socio-cultural processes 
of depersonalisation and (re-)personalisation. It is within this purview of the 
longue durée that I shall locate the specific configuration of impersonal and 
personal forces in the period known as ‘neoliberalism’. I shall argue that, from 
the perspective of the person, neoliberalism constitutes a combined and uneven 
world-systemic project operating through multiple socio-cultural “personae” 
(from homo œconomicus to “wageless life” (Denning 2010)), unified by a counter-
revolutionary project of Restoration whose aim was to negate the “passion for 
the real” [la passion du réel] that characterised much of the twentieth century 
(Badiou 2007). I shall then use these extended sociological and philosophical 
elaborations as a framework within which to read two key contemporary works 
of world-literature: S. J. Naudé’s The Alphabet of Birds (2015) and Rachel 
Kushner’s The Flamethrowers (2013). I interpret these works as attempts to inherit 
the “passion for the real” under conditions of neoliberalism; more precisely, I 
read them as literary rearticulations of the “passion for the real” that aim to 
                                               
4 Cinzia Arruzza (2014) has put this point differently, criticising Wood’s too-sharp distinction 
between the “logic” and “history” of capitalism: “as soon as we accept [Wood’s] distinction 
between the logical structure of capital and its historical dimensions, we can then accept the idea 
that the extraction of surplus-value takes place within the framework of relations between 
formally free and equal individuals without presupposing differences in juridical and political 
status. But we can do this only at a very high level of abstraction – that is to say, at the level of 
the logical structure. From the point of view of concrete history, things change radically.” 
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identify and orient the contemporary reader towards points of the historical Real 
that resist the “organized disorientation” (Badiou 2008: 18) of neoliberalism. 
Both writers employ techniques of impersonality and depersonalisation to carve 
out a fragile space of resistance and formalise hope in an ethico-political 
absolute. In doing so, they not only extend Badiou’s own reflections on the 
intrinsic limitations of the “passion for the real” (not least its intimate bond with 
violence and destruction (cf. Badiou 2007: 48-57)), but also indicate potential 
blind spots in Badiou’s philosophical project itself. 
 
Capital Personified 
Much recent work in the Marxist tradition has argued that we should understand 
capitalism as a social institution or civilization (e.g., Fraser 2014; Arruzza 2014; 
Moore 2015), a contradictory amalgam of wars, money and the state (Alliez & 
Lazzarato 2016), or as a “totality in process” (Monferrand 2017) rather than a 
purely economic system. It is with this body of work in mind that I shall argue 
that capitalist “impersonal domination” is best conceived as a dual process of 
depersonalisation and (re)personalisation. This can be seen in three ways. Firstly, 
in Capital, Marx constantly stresses the way in which impersonal domination 
operates through structural processes of personification. In the famous preface 
to the first edition of Capital he states that “individuals are dealt with here only 
in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers 
[Träger] of particular class-relations and interests” (Marx 1976: 92). Capital’s 
impersonal domination thus works through a system of categorial 
personifications or “masks” [Charaktermasken]. Whilst these personifications 
appear, in their logical immediacy, to be indifferent to the faces and bodies they 
force into relation, they are in fact mediated historical and political results: they are 
“fields of forces” (Basso 2015: 46) that condense both longue-durée structural 
tendencies and conjunctural overdeterminations. Likewise, page after page of 
Capital attests to the structural connection between the sphere of circulation and 
juridical personhood – the “very Eden of the innate rights of man” (Marx 1976: 
280) – and the systematic brutalisation and bodily torture that occurs in the 
hidden abode of production. The structural impersonality of capital thus 
depends upon enforced structural personifications and a system of legally 
mediated personal violence. 
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Secondly, these structural personifications – the attempt, through primitive 
accumulation and state interpellation, to force humans into the functional 
personae of capital accumulation – cannot be separated from wider, systemically 
uneven, socio-cultural processes of personification. Indeed, the “person” as 
such might best be understood as a historically and geographically variable 
dispositif connecting – at any one time – ideological and repressive state 
apparatuses, citizenship discourses, spatial practices, philosophy and cultural 
representations.5 The “person” is a field of class struggle, constantly shifting in 
line with the play of forces of a given conjuncture. Under the capitalist mode of 
production, the dominant dispositif of the person has traditionally had as its 
primary functions identification, separation, and simplification: it identifies and 
separates out individuals from transindividual collectives embedded in pre-
capitalist historical natures, reducing these individuals’ constitutive multiplicity 
to violently simplified racial, sexual, national and other categorisations.6 The 
person has assumed these functions because, within the zone of 
commodification, capitalism requires the production and reproduction of 
individualised legal persons who are ‘free’ to sell their labour-power. The relative 
predominance and efficacy of these functions, however, is historically and 
geographically variable for two reasons. Firstly, in any social formation 
(especially those located at the periphery and semi-periphery of the world-
system) the capitalist mode of production is articulated with residual and 
emergent modes of production on which it must impose its dominance, thus 
giving rise to situations of combined and uneven personhood.7 Secondly, zones 
in which wage labour predominates are increasingly imbricated with and 
surrounded by zones of “wageless life” (Denning 2010) or relative surplus 
populations whose activity is structurally necessary to capital but which is 
external to its primary operations. Consequently, modes of personal capture and 
resistance in, say, the (semi-)peripheral “planet of slums” (Davis 2006) are 
distinct from those within the enfranchised public sphere of the core. Ultimately, 
however, whether at the periphery or the core (albeit to vastly differing extents), 
                                               
5 On the person as dispositif, see Esposito (2012). 
6 I am here condensing ideas found, among others, in Jodi Dean’s (2016) theory of interpellation 
as enclosure; James Scott’s (1998) work on the state construction of “legibility and 
simplification;” and Jason W. Moore’s (2015) notion of “abstract social nature.” It is also 
inspired by Marx’s writings on wood theft, on which see Hartley (2017). 
7 For a clear historical example, see Chakrabarty (1989) on the jute mill workers of Calcutta. 
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workers are gendered, racialised and categorised – as Muslim, black, white, 
immigrant – and these categorisations overdetermine and materially affect, by 
reinforcing or impeding, the continued efficacy of the structural personifications 
of capital. The impersonal domination of capital must thus be understood as 
being in constant articulation with a whole network of potentially contradictory 
socio-cultural personifications. 
Finally, at the level of the capitalist world-system itself, if the “silent 
compulsion” of economic relations implicitly corresponds to a period of 
hegemonic stability in a fully developed capitalist core, this core nonetheless 
relies upon continued primitive accumulation at the world-systemic periphery 
(cf. Jelly-Schapiro forthcoming). Impersonal capitalist consensus always has its 
roots in direct personal violence elsewhere in the world-system, which it 
repatriates to the core during periods of economic crisis (cf. Serfati 2017: 186-
224). These processes overlap with a more general tendency through which 
financialisation, which imposes debtor-creditor dependency, gives rise to 
renewed forms of personal domination both at the core and the periphery 
(Carson 2017). Ultimately, then, it can be said that impersonality and 
depersonalisation, whilst the dominant tendencies of capitalist modernity, are so 
profoundly imbricated with (re-)personalising tendencies that it is only at a high 
level of abstraction that one can plausibly uphold capital’s “structural 
indifference” to “extra-economic identities” (Wood 1995: 267). 
This constant dynamic between systemic depersonalisation and regional (re-
)personalisations is reproduced in the field of culture. Unlike capital itself, 
however, whose impersonality is tendentially “axiomatic” (cf. Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983: 246), in the field of culture impersonality can assume the form 
either of conservative “reterritorializations” (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 34) 
or – alternatively – of emancipatory depersonalisations. To give a general 
example, historically it is well known that cultural forms of personalisation (e.g., 
liberal individualism, romanticism, “culture”) developed partly as a defence 
against the impersonal domination of the “cash nexus” (cf. Williams 1963). Yet 
this, in turn, provoked a backlash in the form of neoclassical impersonalities: 
fascist discipline, religious fundamentalisms, and authoritarian traditionalisms 
are all forms of ethico-political impersonality that reject romantic individualism. 
Inversely, there also exist conservative forms of personalisation which reinforce 
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or attempt to replace the social bond that is severed by the axiomatic of capital 
(e.g., regimes of race; nationalism; the neoconservative family). Emancipatory 
modes of impersonality subsequently develop and take aim at these sometimes 
violent identifications: politically, this includes practices of “solidarity,” an 
impersonal ethico-political mode of social relation indifferent to specific 
national or ethnic identities, whilst, philosophically, one might cite Badiou’s 
(2003) understanding of truths as indifferent to differences or Jacques Rancière’s 
(1999: 36) notion of subjectivation as disidentification – both variations on 
communist universality. Capitalist impersonal domination, then, both at the 
level of the economy and of culture, is best understood as a combined and 
uneven process of depersonalisation and (re-)personalisation.  
 
The Combined and Uneven Personae of Neoliberalism 
 
The internal extreme of this dynamic occurs when selected elements of personal 
resistance are strategically incorporated into operations of capital accumulation. 
It is precisely this process that Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello explore in The 
New Spirit of Capitalism (2005 [1999]). They argue that the “artistic critique” of 
capitalism (against alienation and lack of autonomy and creativity) voiced during 
the French insurrection of May 1968 became separated from the “social 
critique” (of capitalist exploitation and egoism) and was incorporated into the 
management discourse of post-Fordist capitalism.8 In so doing, the “anti-
Oedipal” critique of centralised, hierarchical and impersonal bureaucratic 
structures became co-opted by the neoliberal restructuring of capital. Where 
corporations of the 1960s had purposely rejected “‘personal judgements’ … in 
decisions about promotion, in favour of ‘impersonal judgement’ on the basis of 
results” (67), managerial discourse of the 1990s reintroduced “criteria of 
personality and the use of personal relations” (85): “Charisma, vision, gifts of 
communication, intuition, mobility and generalism become the ideal traits of the 
new leaders – dressed-down, cool capitalists like Bill Gates or ‘Ben and Jerry’ … 
who refuse to surround themselves with the formal trappings of bureaucratic 
authority” (Budgen 2000: 153). At the same time, neoliberal personhood has 
also been understood as a backlash against second-wave feminism and the new 
                                               
8 This argument is challenged by Dardot and Laval (2013: 262). 
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social movements of the 1960s whose rallying cry was that “the personal is 
political”: “the neoliberal reaction consolidated in the 1980s recodes the person 
as the personal: it privatizes politics by making personal experience the test of 
political action; it reduces political action to the representation of identities, with 
the crucial qualification that these identities, though passed off as equivalent, are 
not at all equal” (Haines 2017: 182; cf. Dean 2016 chap. 1). On these readings, 
neoliberalism effected a double privatisation of the person: a repersonalisation 
of the private corporation and a reactionary privatisation of an attempted 
depersonalisation of the private realm. 
Other critiques of neoliberal subjectivity have developed along primarily 
Foucauldian lines. Dardot and Laval, for example, hold that neoliberalism 
should be understood as a “rationality” which effects a “generalization of 
competition as a behavioural norm and of the enterprise as a model of 
subjectivation” (2013: 4). A new work ethic is said to have developed whereby 
“individual aspirations and the enterprise’s objectives of excellence … can only 
be conjoined if everyone becomes a small enterprise” (ibid.: 266). Consequently, 
as Wendy Brown puts it, 
we may (and neoliberalism interpellates us as subjects who do) think and 
act like contemporary market subjects where monetary wealth 
generation is not the immediate issue, for example, in approaching one’s 
education, health, fitness, family life, or neighbourhood … Thus, one 
might approach one’s dating life in the mode of an entrepreneur or 
investor … A student might undertake charitable service to enrich her 
college application profile. (2015: 31) 
The irony is that whilst this internalisation of market principles is meant to offer 
flexibility and subjective dynamism, it may actually erode personality altogether. 
Post-Fordist short-termism, lack of long-term predictable careers, and instability 
of “projects” produce a “pliant” self that is little more than what Richard Sennett 
has described, in a phrase reminiscent of the modernist artwork, as a “collage of 
fragments unceasing in its becoming, ever open to new experience” (cited in 
Dardot & Laval 2013: 290). As in the Sartrean dialectic of winner loses, 
neoliberal personalisation begets further depersonalisation. 
One of the problems with such theories of neoliberal conduct, however, 
is that they often suppose a single subject of neoliberalism known variously as 
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homo œconomicus or the “entrepreneurial subject.” Yet the supposed reign of homo 
œconomicus would then be coeval with the widely documented demise of the single 
revolutionary subject – and privileged revolutionary site – that many claim was 
hegemonic in the workers’ movement: the male industrial worker in the factory. 
As Aaron Benanav et al. (2015: 277) have written of the contemporary moment: 
“The working class – always internally differentiated – displays a diminishing 
capacity for unification under a single hegemonic figure, thus realising its always 
latent tendency to decompose into fragments, facing off one against the other.” 
On the one hand, there is nothing surprising about such social and political 
decomposition during a period of increasing deindustrialisation, the demise of 
the trade unions, and totalising processes of privatisation. On the other, 
however, the focus, especially in Foucauldian accounts, on the figure of homo 
œconomicus at the expense of all other subjects of neoliberalism suggests that the 
social and geographical scope of such approaches is too limited. Annie 
McClanahan has recently argued that “by characterizing neoliberalism through 
a specific kind of entrepreneurial subject … we miss the possibility that 
neoliberalism is not the becoming-economic of the non-economic, but rather 
the introduction of economic exigencies into the lives of a group – white, 
educated, upper middle-class citizens of the developed world – formerly 
protected from them” (2017: 512). She suggests that a more “exemplary” subject 
of the present would be “an underemployed part-timer, probably working in the 
service sector, buying her groceries on her credit card and cashing her paychecks 
at a check cashing service, renting rather than owning her home, barely able to 
survive day to day and thus unlikely to see any of this precarity as an interest-
bearing investment in her own future” (ibid.: 513). Furthermore, Eli Jelly-
Schapiro’s (forthcoming) important account of the “multiple temporalities” of 
neoliberalism across the world-system – he names them primitive accumulation, 
expanded reproduction, and “accumulation by fabrication” – identifies a range 
of political subjects, each of which is dominant in one or another time-space of 
the neoliberal world-system: migrant “wageless life” (the phrase is Denning’s 
2010), the wage labourer, and the proletarianised middle class. If theories of 
“neoliberalism” are to retain their critical incisiveness, they will thus have to 
broaden their conception of its dramatis personae: no longer homo œconomicus alone, 
but an uneven combination of exemplary subjects which, in varying rhythms 
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and ratios, constitutes the objective fact of neoliberal social (de)composition and 
the diffuse material and geographical basis for the emergence of any future 
revolutionary subject. 
Beyond this emphasis on the world-systemic multiplicity of neoliberal 
personae, however, I would like to suggest that the philosophy of Alain Badiou 
offers a rich new perspective on the nature of neoliberal subjectivity. Badiou 
never uses the term neoliberalism but his philosophical account of 
contemporary subjectivity deals with many of its recognised features. For 
Badiou the period since approximately 1975 has been characterised by 
worldlessness.9 In his terms, a world is a logic of appearance in which all are 
entitled to a name and which is “tensed” by “points”; naming signifies the 
possibility of an inscription into a political process (e.g., class struggle or national 
liberation), whilst a “point” submits the situation to the decisional pressure of 
an absolute “yes or no” decision (especially characteristic of revolutionary 
situations). Today, Badiou argues (writing at the turn of the twenty-first century), 
there exists no logic of the visible, a general acceptance of non-nomination and 
a general “pointlessness”; worldlessness has replaced the world, excluding the 
majority of humanity from visibility (potential or actual) and from the absolute 
yes or no of revolutionary decision – i.e., from the possibility of political 
subjectivation. The logic of a world has given way to the anarchic illogic of 
universal substitutability, commodified ideals of youthfulness, passive 
hedonism, and a present so fleeting as seemingly to defy all proactive formation. 
How did this situation come about? For Badiou it is the end result of a 
sustained Thermidorean reaction to the last historical sequence of the 
“communist hypothesis” (1966-75);10 that is, neoliberalism is a fundamentally 
counter-revolutionary subjective project. The communist hypothesis in the 
twentieth century was driven by what Badiou calls a “passion for the real” [la 
passion du réel] (2007: 32): “There is a conviction, laden with pathos, that we are 
being summoned to the real of a beginning.” Where the nineteenth century 
“announced, dreamed, and promised,” the twentieth century “declared it would 
make man, here and now” (ibid.). In stark contrast to the ever-calculating 
                                               
9 What follows is an abbreviated reconstruction of arguments put forth in Badiou (2009; 2014). 
Badiou is not alone in this somewhat bizarre-sounding diagnosis: it can also be found in Franck 
Fischbach (2016) and Gopal Balakrishnan (2009: 26). 
10 Badiou (2008: 35–6) identifies two modern sequences of the communist hypothesis: 1789–
1871 and 1917–1976, within which 1966–1975 constitutes something like a sub-sequence. 
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entrepreneurial subject, this conviction was characterized by a “steadfast 
indifference to its cost” (ibid.: 33) – both physical and personal. The “passion 
for the real” was thus, in one sense, a violent and destructive desire for immediate 
collective self-actualisation, a desire that found all semblance or mediation 
intrinsically suspect (hence the twentieth-century’s gravitation to the slogan of 
the purge); yet it also harboured a ‘subtractive’ orientation – “a differential and 
differentiating passion devoted to the construction of a minimal difference” (as 
in Malevich’s White on White (1918)) (56) – which understands the gap between 
real and semblance as itself real and thereby aims “to invent content at the very 
place of the minimal difference” (57). More recently, Badiou has redefined 
destruction and subtraction as the negative and affirmative parts of negation 
respectively, proposing that any inheritance of the passion for the real will 
involve “maintain[ing] the complete concept of negation from the point of view 
of subtraction” rather than destruction (i.e., the inverse of the twentieth-
century). In other words, any contemporary revolutionary project must avoid 
the following three partial types of negation: negation without destruction (what 
Badiou calls capitalist-parliamentarianism); negation without subtraction (nihilist 
will-to-obliteration; terrorist violence); and subtraction without destruction (a 
semi-depressive “dropping out” of the world; or, the Hegelian beautiful soul).11 
To inherit the passion for the real under neoliberalism is thus to invent 
affirmative negations – productive, enduring recompositions of the world – and 
yet to do so in a situation of general worldlessness.  
The exemplary figure of Badiou’s philosophy is the “faithful subject.” 
Without wishing to rehearse Badiou’s theory of subjectivation in full, suffice it 
to say that for Badiou the entirety of ethics comes down to fidelity to the event: 
“Do all that you can to persevere in that which exceeds your perseverance. 
Persevere in the interruption. Seize in your being that which has seized and 
broken you” (Badiou 2001: 47). In the terms of this essay, fidelity should be 
understood as an impersonal operation. It is impersonal because whilst an 
individual belongs to a truth-process as ‘herself’ (a multiple singularity) she is 
simultaneously in excess of herself – fidelity “passes through” her (Badiou 2001: 
45). Badiouian impersonality, like the passion for the real, is that within one’s 
                                               
11 I am drawing here on Noys (2010: 146-7). 
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self which goes beyond oneself.12 From the perspective of the dispositif of the 
person, it is a process of profound, emancipatory depersonalisation. It invokes 
militant subjective orientations at odds not only with entrepreneurial rationality 
and youthful hedonism, but also with one further neoliberal ideological persona: 
the victim. Where the “passion for the real” implied a conception of man as a 
programme or project, the dominant ideology of the twenty-first century is, 
according to Badiou, a “project-less humanism” premised on the victimised 
body; “man” becomes “a substantialist or naturalist category, which we attain 
through empathy in the spectacle of suffering” (Badiou 2007: 176). This so-
called “animal humanism” (Badiou 2007: 175) is the vision of humanity imposed 
by the neoliberal Restoration and lives on in what Nina Powers and Alberto 
Toscano (2009: 32) have called “the ‘antitotalitarian’ credo … and the 
anticommunist philosophies of finitude, liberalism, and human rights.” If 
neoliberal management discourse was a “reactive subject” which positively 
incorporated the joyous “artistic” and hedonist elements of the global uprisings 
of the long 1960s, then the pious champions of human rights and the Pax 
Americana tempered that joy with an equally novel melancholy of finitude.13 To 
rearticulate Badiou’s argument in terms of the present essay, then, one might say 
that neoliberalism relies upon a dispositif of the person that violently separates the body 
from its impersonal potential. 
We are now in a position to propose some provisional theses on 
combined and uneven neoliberal subjectivity and its relation to impersonality: 
1. Foucauldian theories of homo œconomicus are powerful but partial: 
they underestimate the extent to which neoliberalism consists of 
multiple temporalities and uneven geographies, producing 
multiple exemplary personae (e.g., “wageless life,” the wage 
labourer, and the proletarianised middle class). These structural 
personifications predominate over – and enter into occasionally 
                                               
12 As Alberto Toscano observes, “it is a passion that inhabits its subjects as what is in themselves 
more than themselves” (Badiou 2007: 220, n. 32). 
13 By “reactive subject” Badiou (2009: 54ff.) means those renegade figures (he has in mind the 
nouveaux philosophes) who, though once involved in a political sequence, now deny the necessity 
of rupture embodied in the political event, yet who incorporate (and often passively benefit 
from) certain of its novelties whilst producing new discourses to delegitimise faithful 
subjectivity. 
 12 
explosive combinations with – far wider socio-cultural practices 
of personhood. 
2. The multiplication of exemplary neoliberal personae is 
coextensive with the widely documented objective decomposition 
of the workers’ movement throughout the “long downturn.” 
This decomposition is at once social and geographical, 
generating confusion over both the identity and location of the 
contemporary revolutionary subject. 
3. At the level of subjectivity, neoliberalism constitutes a collective 
“reactive subject” whose unconscious is the spectre of the 
communist hypothesis.14 It is composed of multiple practices of 
(to risk a strategically inexact analogy) subjective primitive 
accumulation: where objective primitive accumulation separates 
workers from the land, subjective primitive accumulation 
separates bodies from Ideas.15 Neoliberalism operates 
personalising privatisations of the emancipatory potential of the impersonal. 
This is the subjective matrix in which contemporary world-literature intervenes. 
 
Impersonality in Contemporary World-Literature  
 
In what follows I shall argue that SJ Naudé’s The Alphabet of Birds and Rachel 
Kushner’s The Flamethrowers intervene in this neoliberal conjuncture in three 
ways. First, they both attempt to inherit, and remain faithful to, the passion for 
the real that is structurally denied by neoliberalism; they do so via 
experimentations with impersonality and depersonalisation that foreground the 
Badiouian virtue of courage, which Benjamin Noys has suggestively 
reinterpreted as “a virtue that orients itself to a point, to a Real, in the intervallic 
period of the absence of the event … a non-heroic political virtue … woven out 
                                               
14 Cf. Badiou (2009: 56): “the form of the faithful subject nonetheless remains the unconscious 
of the reactive subject.” 
15 Cf. Badiou (2014: 125): “The violence that compels the individual to become a commodified 
body [un corps marchand] is not direct violence against the body, it is a violence done to the capacity 
of the body in the idea, to its capacity to be the bearer of something other than its own interests.” 
(I am grateful to Daria Saburova for help in translating this difficult sentence). For Badiou, 
“democracy” in neoliberal guise consists in the violent command to “live without Idea” (ibid.); 
the “bare power” [pouvoir nu] that secretly drives contemporary democracy “exerts considerable 
violence at the level of what one might call the frontier zone between bodies and ideas” (ibid.: 
128). 
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of political memories which are not mere nostalgia, but also critique and re-
formulation” (Noys 2010: 153). Naudé and Kushner critically mobilise a certain 
nostalgia for modernism and the avant-garde as a way of (re)formulating militant 
twentieth-century subjectivities that resist the hegemonic figures of 
neoliberalism. Second, in line with Fredric Jameson’s transcoding of Aristotelian 
anagnorisis (‘recognition’) as the ‘discovery’ of collective political subjects who 
have previously been overlooked – “the coming into view of those 
multitudinous others suppressed from the official story and field of vision” 
(2009: 565) – I hold that Kushner and Naudé provide subjective cognitive maps 
of selected subjects of neoliberalism, enabling an aesthetically unified 
representation of that which is, objectively, geographically and socially 
dispersed. Finally, I argue that these works of fiction suggest potential blind 
spots in Badiou’s philosophy itself, not least the manner in which faithful 
subjects, pace Badiou, “are incessantly undone, circumvented, manipulated by a 
Subject [Capital] which is both made up of nothing but their very actions and 
simultaneously an abstraction over which they seem to exercise no ultimate 
control” (Toscano 2007: 198). Both works are examples of what one might call 
“anti-worldless literature”: a committed search for the traces of a “world” within 
the non-world of neoliberalism – “a network of signs that we can scan and 
assemble” (Badiou 2014: 113). 
 The remarkable stories collected in S. J. Naudé’s The Alphabet of Birds 
(2015) span the entire globe: Milan, rural South Africa, a castle near Nuremberg, 
Berlin, Hanoi, Tokyo, Paris, Lesotho, Johannesburg, Phoenix, London, Dubai, 
and Cape Town. Within and between these places, Naudé – acutely attuned to 
the capitalist production of space – is drawn to those locations or architectural 
styles characterised by combined and uneven development: a state-of-the-art 
neo-modernist hunting lodge cheek-by-jowl with a corrugated iron shack in the 
South African outback (2015: 76-77); “[r]emarkable,” the narrator of one story 
exclaims, “the proximity of the two things: the perfect and the abject, the room 
and the destroyed space” (128). Like the Italian futurists who inspire the first 
story “The Noise Machine,” one senses that, for Naudé, such combined and 
uneven spaces are not simply statically objective geographies, but produce a 
subjective surplus: they are the “‘weak links in the chain,’ where the Real may 
appear without warning” (Jameson 2012: 474). Four of the stories feature a gay 
 14 
male protagonist (different each time) who has recently quit his high-flying job 
at an elite multinational corporation. We follow his string of erotic encounters 
across global cities and their underworlds, his endless nights of partying and 
intoxication. In each case, the narrator – despite his tendency to Bacchanalian 
self-destruction – is always the mundane counterpart to a mysterious male figure 
driven by strangely absolute existential “visions,” neo-modernist artistic 
projects, or what one character calls a “hard, impersonal scheme” (223; emphasis 
added). Such bouts of drug-fuelled reverie are counterposed both to these 
impersonal projects and to the knowledge, or presence, of the decaying body of 
the protagonist’s mother (a recurring figure), who is dying of terminal cancer. 
Even those stories which do not feature a male protagonist contain damaged or 
decaying female bodies. The principal interest of these stories lies in the way in 
which, in and through the twin neoliberal figures of the victim and the hedonist, 
they stage acts of fidelity to absolute ethico-political projects which are indifferent 
to the suffering bodies through which they are realised. 
 In the story “Van,” Sandrien, a white Afrikaner woman, retrains to 
become a nurse. She cares for patients – most of whom are dying from 
HIV/AIDS – in a provincial rural area near Blomfontein in South Africa. When 
she learns that she is suffering from terminal cancer she rejects further treatment 
so as to dedicate herself to her work. Increasingly pathologically driven by an 
absolute determination to cure or care for her patients irrespective of personal 
cost, she alienates her husband, Kobus, who attempts to make her see reason, 
and becomes entangled in a complex, transnational web of finance capital, 
NGOs and corrupt state institutions. Of all the stories in the collection, it is 
“Van” that shows most clearly the inseparability of any possible inheritance of 
the “passion for the real” from the many mediations of the world-systemic 
project of neoliberalism. 
 In Naudé’s fictional universe there exists a moral morphology of the 
body: roundness or curves are outward signs of corruption whilst angularity and 
corporeal dissolution are indices of virtue. The “round head” (2015: 85) and 
“squeaky clean … little rolls of fat” of Walter Mabunda, a corrupt provincial 
health minister, and the cheeks, “still lovely as a baby’s” (44), of Mrs Nyathi, a 
cunning and manipulative guest house owner, are in stark contrast to the “sore, 
sharp corners of bodies” (56) that Sandrien discovers on her rounds. Sandrien 
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admits to being surprised at discovering the existence of these hidden subjects: 
“I could not have imagined. … Invisible, just on the other side of these hills … 
Dozens of them” (56). Combining the recurring figure of modernist linearity 
and abstraction with the sudden “discovery” (or anagnorisis) of a new collective 
subject, the story traces Sandrien’s absolute commitment to these suffering, 
angular bodies.16 When told by Lerato (an example of the corrupt, post-
apartheid nouveaux riches) who blocks Sandrien’s efforts at every turn, that “we 
can only do what we can do,” Sandrien replies: “‘We can do more, much more!’ 
We can find the divine fibres in our weak flesh, the undiscovered grace in our entrails!” (70; 
emphasis in original). These “divine fibres” and “undiscovered grace” are figures 
of that impersonal potentiality that is so violently extinguished by the neoliberal 
reactive subject. Sandrien engages in a “passion for the real” worthy of the 
twentieth century: her resolve is absolute and her indifference to her own well-
being is borderline maniacal, her body gradually wasting away and dehydrating 
into dust. Yet her fidelity to an ethico-political absolute is intrinsically marred 
because her project is internally structured by a misguided saviour fantasy: “she 
will be able to keep everyone safe. Soon she will be able to carry all the dying. 
She will hold them in the palm of her hand” (72). This narcissism is connected 
to Sandrien’s inability to read her situation: “All these connections make me 
dizzy … I don’t know what my involvement is supposed to be” (79). The story 
is thus tragic, in the precise sense that tragedy entails “the recognition of a strain 
of insouciant refractoriness to human agency that is woven into the very fabric 
of action itself” (Aryeh Kosman, cited in Eagleton 2003: 78). Yet here the 
“insouciant refractoriness” is not some transhistorical “all-too-human” flaw, but 
that point at which the Real of the self meets the Real of Capital to undermine 
individual life-projects. 
 Sandrien constantly attempts – unsuccessfully – to access antiretroviral 
drugs for her patients from (corrupt) state-run provincial health services and a 
US NGO named “Widereach,” loosely modelled on the “U.S. President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief” (PEPFAR). At one point she is told that she 
will not receive antiretrovirals because Widereach’s “emphasis will be on 
                                               
16 Elsewhere one character is described as a “living Giacometti” (Naudé 2015: 16) with a “bone 
structure … angular, like something from a Futurist painting” (18). In yet another story, a 
dancer’s body is described as “[l]ike something from modernist photography – an Edward 
Weston study of the body as abstraction” (280). 
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abstinence campaigns, rather than condom use … These are the values of 
Middle America: we’re talking faith-based organisations. Those are the ones now 
holding the money” (73). Indeed, when PEPFAR was introduced in 2003, 
current Vice President of the United States, Mike Pence, told congress: 
“Abstinence and marital faithfulness before condom distribution are the cure 
for what ails the families of Africa … It is important that we not just send them 
money, but that we send them values that work” (cited in Frankel 2017). Yet 
even those PEPFAR schemes that do not promote the Orwellian-sounding “A-
B-C strategy (Abstinence – Be Faithful – Condom Use)” have still tended to 
promote its politico-economic counterpart, neoliberalism, by “systematically 
ignor[ing] the role of structural inequality and the differential political economy 
of risk, while focusing entirely on ‘high-risk’ individual behaviors” (Sastry & 
Dutta 2013: 25). PEPFAR measures the effects of HIV/AIDS in terms of “the 
number of hours and dollar amounts of productivity lost” (ibid.: 28); it binds 
HIV/AIDS – via Orientalist representations – to local cultural norms (e.g., early 
marriage and polygamy). It also systematically ignores the structural factors 
behind such conduct, such as change in agricultural ownership patterns or large-
scale unemployment resulting from structural adjustment programs (ibid.: 31). 
In terms of the capitalist dynamics of impersonality and (re-)personalisation, 
then, Sandrien finds herself at the centre of two interlinked processes. On the 
one hand, South African state institutions are insufficiently impersonal, mired in 
such profound corruption that personal dependency trumps bureaucratic 
abstraction at every turn. On the other, the re-personalising values of 
neoconservatism, forged as an ideological solution to the social contradictions 
of the neoliberal counterrevolution (cf. Harvey 2005: 82ff.), have now become 
the moral wing of US-led neo-imperial privatisation. It is thus no surprise that 
Sandrien feels “dizzy” at all these “connections.”  
 The true object of Naudé’s scorn, however, is the white Afrikaner 
farmers. No longer assured of their material privileges, many have had to 
reinvent themselves. The farmers affected in “Van” have two options: sell out 
to hunting-farm developers or set up a funeral business. Those who opt for the 
latter now use the fridges that once housed slaughtered cattle to store the 
plentiful supply of black HIV/AIDS cadavers until they can be buried in the – 
expensively – hard ground (“Soil structure determines profit,” Manie informs 
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Sandrien). It is thus in the interests of the white Afrikaners to keep the black 
corpses flowing. When Kobus tells Sandrien he is considering starting a funeral 
business – “One must adapt, one must naturalise” (69) – she tells him that if he 
does so she will never look him in the eye again. Indeed, there is a sense in which 
Kobus mobilises the ideology of modest domestic comforts to counteract 
Sandrien’s radical impersonality. On one level, everything he utters or writes is 
a perfectly reasonable response to his wife’s monomaniacal and self-sacrificial 
behaviour; on the other, it is an attempt to separate Sandrien from her 
impersonal potential, from that within her that is more than herself: the “divine 
fibres” of her “weak flesh.” First he tells her not to feel guilty about their relative 
privilege, then he accuses her of not wanting to be part of a community (“I have 
my community,” she tells him), until finally, at his wit’s end, he writes her a letter: 
“You want to collapse the pain and stench into one blinding truth. Where do you make the 
people behind the truth disappear to? And do they understand your abstract manner of saving 
them?” (81; emphasis in original). On one level, he is of course right, but on 
another, we know that from Burke to the nouveaux philosophes reactionary thought 
proceeds by way of accusations of “abstraction.” Predictably, yet 
understandably, Kobus’ own truth consists in “the silence of our bedroom, the flashes 
of lightning passing between our skins…when I stick out my fingers and am touching real 
flesh. And for me that is enough” (82; emphasis in original). Kobus is, in a sense, an 
ideal-type literary realist, insisting on the importance of the human individuals 
behind the structures and truths, maintaining the primacy of the suffering and 
erotic body, the domestic space of the home, the concrete over the abstract, and 
a defender of the “minor sorrow” (81). In an astonishing ideological legerdemain, 
Kobus effectively recasts what Auerbach once referred to as “creatural realism” 
(2003: 247) into a counterrevolutionary fidelity to finitude under neoliberalism. 
 Yet Sandrien’s own absolute fidelity, as we have seen, has tragic flaws. 
“If only you had an idea of the scale of things, of how puny you are,” Lerato 
tells her when accused of having hired an assassin to kill her. By failing 
adequately to map the web of social relations in which she is involved, Sandrien’s 
project is scuppered on the rocks of romanticism: “The system is irrelevant,” 
she says at one point, “it’s about the victims” (71). Yet, as we have seen, the 
system precisely is not irrelevant: at every step, a powerful combination of 
predatory international capital and intra-state corruption have prevented her – 
 18 
and by extension her patients – from receiving lifesaving antiretrovirals. Her 
absoluteness of vision prevents a serious engagement with the world-systemic 
mediations of HIV/AIDS, thus ironically reproducing the very neoliberal 
individualism of the NGOs that impede her. This insistence on absoluteness is 
also a potential weakness in Badiou’s philosophy itself – an underestimation of 
the extent to which capital and ideology subtly, immanently unwork the projects 
of faithful subjects. Nonetheless, Sandrien’s impersonal heroism powerfully 
delineates a space within the neoliberal ideological environment, dominated by 
paeans to finitude, in which something else – something like a world – becomes 
visible. In a later story we learn that, shortly before she died, the state-of-the art 
hunting lodge – intended to host a World Cup after-party for global VIPs – has 
been burnt to the ground. 
  Rachel Kushner’s 2013 novel The Flamethrowers extends many of these 
ideas. It is a novel about an anonymous young female motorcyclist who moves 
to New York from Reno in the 1970s to become an artist. She becomes involved 
with a successful male Italian-American artist, Sandro Valera, whose minimalist 
art plays on the shift that is underway in New York from Fordism to post-
Fordism, and whose father was initially an Italian futurist (modelled on 
Marinetti) who later became a motorcycle and rubber tyre magnate (modelled 
on Henry Ford). Towards the end of the novel, the protagonist visits the now 
deceased magnate’s automobile factories in Milan, at the height of the anni di 
piombo and the ferment of insurrection. The Flamethrowers is one of the most 
profound contemporary experiments in literary impersonality precisely because 
it is so alert to the manner in which what begins as an emancipatory 
depersonalisation – such as the futurist desire for an impersonal speed that can 
break with all oppressive bonds of the past – can swiftly become incorporated 
into new, more powerful capitalist processes of personification. As Eli Jelly-
Schapiro (forthcoming) has observed, it also maps and connects the “three 
temporalities of contemporary capital” and their specific modes of resistance. 
 Impersonality is integral to Kushner’s stylistic project. Consciously 
opposed to the personal, self-expressive tendency of much contemporary 
fiction, Kushner “wanted a narrator who could convey a tone that was like 
thought and wasn’t at all like a spoken account or historical testimony or a 
confession or a performance of any kind” (Hart & Rocca 2015: 201). Inspired 
 19 
by the narratorial voice of Roberto Bolaño’s Savage Detectives, which she describes 
as being “like water” (Barron 2013), the voice of the first-person narrator in The 
Flamethrowers is, relatively speaking, “neutral.” Kushner achieves this effect by 
associating the voice with the passive, self-withdrawing nature of the nameless 
protagonist herself: just as “Reno” is dominated by the speech of others, a 
speech on which she thrives, from which she learns, so the guiding narratorial 
idiom subordinates itself to multiple character idioms for long stretches, or – 
during passages of interior monologue – assumes a casual yet essay-like 
impersonality whose complexity is at odds with the protagonist’s supposed 
naivety.17 This stylistic and characterological passivity becomes integral to one 
of the recurring themes of the novel: the idea of waiting. Contrary to the 
patriarchal men – whether avant-gardists, artists, or business men – who act 
according to rigidly designed plans, “Reno” waits: “I, too, had it in me to wait. 
To expect change to come from the outside, to concentrate on the task of 
meeting it, waiting to meet it, rather than going out and finding it” (Kushner 
2013: 88). There is a paradoxical proactivity at work in this waiting; it is a “task” 
that requires what Alberto Toscano has called, in a different context, “non-
dogmatic anticipation” (2010: 197; emphasis in original). Thus, the impersonal style 
becomes integral to a larger project of militant waiting whose aim is precisely to 
scan the terrain of worldlessness for the advent of an event or an irruption of 
the Real. 
 The style is also connected to the autodeigetic narrator’s desire for what 
might be called an absolute non-relationality. In the opening pages, for example, 
skiing is understood as a type of drawing whose ideal would be tracelessness 
(Kushner 2013: 9) whilst “Reno’s” youthful adoration of Flip Farmer, a land 
speed record holder, is inspired by the feeling that, in his presence, “[w]e weren’t 
individuals but a surface he moved over, smiling and remote” (ibid.: 21). Later, 
“Reno” works as a “China Girl,” a model whose facial skin tones are used by 
lab technicians for cinematic colour-control for Caucasian skin.18 Spliced into 
film leaders, China Girls generally went unseen by the public, but if they were 
seen “they flashed by so fast they had to be instantly reconstructed in the mind” 
(87): “I would be looked at, but by people who didn’t know who I was. I would 
                                               
17 “Reno” is the name ascribed to the protagonist by others. 
18 This is a further example of the impersonal-personal dynamic: the mechanical impersonality 
of film is, in fact, a deeply racializing technology designed to codify whiteness as the social norm. 
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be looked at but remain anonymous” (85). This desire simultaneously to be 
looked at yet to remain anonymous links impersonality to a failed – or perhaps 
subtracted – dialectic of recognition, in which the formal prerequisites of 
interpersonal recognition are minimally present but are undermined by a 
depersonalising force which is felt to be emancipatory. “Reno” elsewhere speaks 
of personhood itself as a prison: “We seemed to share certain ideas about what 
happens in childhood, when you have to place yourself under the sign of your 
own name, your face, your voice, your outward reality. When you become a 
fixed position … as if the container of my person were some kind of terrible 
mistake” (101). In a classic anti-Oedipal manoeuvre, speed and anonymity thus 
become for “Reno” a means of resisting the violent personifications of the 
dispositif of the person. 
 Yet the novel complicates this accelerationist logic by demonstrating 
that both speed and anonymity are themselves connected to violent processes 
of personification. Kushner’s ingenious, if potentially misleading, conflation of 
Marinetti and Henry Ford in the single figure of T. P. Valera subtly undermines 
“Reno’s” emancipatory conception of speed. From the primal scene in which 
Valera’s first sighting of a motorcycle is fused with his erotic desire for the 
woman riding it – a scene that occurs in Alexandria and conforms to Jameson’s 
(1991: 309-10) argument that modernism is the result of incomplete 
modernisation19 – speed becomes coextensive with what one might term petro-
patriarchy: a (literally) toxic masculinity informed by a misogynist metaphysics in 
which “[w]omen were trapped in time” (Kushner 2013: 77), destined to become 
“pocket cunts” (76). Yet what began as an avant-garde explosion has become, 
by the 1970s, a mainstream Honda advert: “Speed is every man’s right” (13). 
Matthew Huber has argued that oil has been integral to the rise of a mode of 
sociality he calls “petro-privatism” which underlies neoliberal subjectivity: 
“Energy powered the privatisation of social space. By extending the productive 
forces of capital … to the reproductive forces of everyday life, a specific stratum 
of American workers could now live, think, and feel an individuated sense of 
power over the geographies of everyday practices. Life appeared to some as a 
coherent space of privatised freedom” (2013: xv). As well as enabling an 
                                               
19 “It was the discord that had struck him so many years earlier … It had been the discord of 
the two, cracked limestone wall and gleaming motor parts” (Kushner 2013: 39). Jameson’s 
hypothesis is supported by Ram (2012). 
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emancipatory non-relationality, then, speed becomes harnessed to a petro-
infrastructure which inculcates the very neoliberal entrapment in the personal 
from which “Reno” desires to escape. 
 This infrastructure, however, is not limited to the confines of a single 
nation-state. Perhaps inspired by Henry Ford’s ill-fated Amazonian “utopia” of 
“Fordlandia,” Valera’s tyre business comes to rely upon imported Brazilian 
rubber. Once a major late nineteenth-century commodity frontier, wreaking 
genocidal devastation in the Amazon basin, by the 1920s Asia had become the 
world capital of rubber production. Yet when Valera’s supplies from Malaysia 
are cut off, he – like Ford – turns to the Amazon. Realising his futurist roots, 
Valera subordinates nature and the local “Indians” to his will: “The jungle was 
a standing army, a reserve that would summon forth a product, become 
something other than green, useless, hostile nature, and Valera liked this idea, of 
conscripting nature into service” (Kushner 2013: 126). The indigenous tappers 
work on credit: “It was all indebtedness and credit, zero outlay of actual money. 
Credit came from credo, which was to believe. … The Indians in the jungle were 
going to work for free” (127). If the labourers fail to conform to the “optimum 
calibration” for profit – i.e., “within human limits, but just barely” (127) – they 
are kept in line by “cheap muzzle-loaders, mock drownings … and various 
further entrenchments of [their] peon status” (214). This is the primal scene of 
primitive accumulation at the periphery of the world-system – direct personal 
violence and slavery mediated by credit – which is the material precondition of 
the cultures of speed and petro-privatism at the core. 
Fundamentally, then, The Flamethrowers is a novel about a historical 
period in which the great revolutionary desire for an anonymous, impersonal 
absolute – a passion for the real – becomes almost indistinguishable from the 
absolute speed of capital. The genius of Kushner’s novel, however, lies in the 
manner in which it demonstrates that the great, uneven struggle of capital and 
communism cannot be neatly mapped on to the structuring binaries of the novel 
itself – speed versus slowness, action versus waiting, naming versus anonymity. 
Rather, the central contradiction internally divides each term of the binary. Thus, 
“waiting” is split between a communist anticipation of the evental insurrection 
and the patience intrinsic to the art of the business deal (a capitalist kairos) (cf. 
129). It is precisely this process of internal diremption which, I have been 
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arguing, occurs in the dialectic of capitalist impersonality and personalisation in 
general: persons split into structural personifications, romantic 
neoterritorialisations, and state interpellations; impersonality splits into capitalist 
axiomatics, reactionary neo-territorialisations and emancipatory 
depersonalisations. If the “passion for the real” is to be inherited in the 
neoliberal present it must pass by way of these immanent socio-cultural 





Alliez, Éric & Maurizio Lazzarato. 2016. Guerres et Capital. Paris: Éditions 
Amsterdam. 
Anderson, Perry. 1984. “Modernity and Revolution.” New Left Review I/144: 96–
113. 
Arruzza, Cinzia. 2014. “Remarks on Gender.” Viewpoint Magazine. URL: 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2014/09/02/remarks-on-gender/ 
[Last accessed: 9/10/17]. 
Auerbach, Erich. 2003 [1946]. Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Badiou, Alain. 1999 [1989]. Manifesto for Philosophy. Trans. Norman Madarasz. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Badiou, Alain. 2001 [1993]. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. Trans. 
Peter Hallward. London: Verso. 
Badiou, Alain. 2003 [1997]. Saint Paul: the Foundation of Universalism. Trans. Ray 
Brassier. California: Stanford University Press. 
Badiou, Alain. 2005 [1998]. Metapolitics. Trans. Jason Barker. London: Verso. 
Badiou, Alain. 2007 [2005]. The Century. Trans. Alberto Toscano. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Badiou, Alain. 2008. “The Communist Hypothesis.” New Left Review. 49: 29-42. 
Badiou, Alain. 2008 [2007]. The Meaning of Sarkozy. Trans. David Fernbach. 
London: Verso. 
Badiou, Alain. 2009 [2006]. Logics of Worlds. Trans. Alberto Toscano. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
Badiou, Alain. 2014. Images du temps présent: 2001–2004. Paris: Fayard. 
Balakrishnan, Gopal. 2009. “Speculations on the Stationary State.” New Left 
Review. 59: 5–26. 
Barron, Jesse. 2013. “Insurrection: An Interview with Rachel Kushner.” Paris 
Review. URL: 
https://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2013/04/03/insurrection-an-
interview-with-rachel-kushner/ [Last accessed: 12/10/17] 
Basso, Luca. 2015. Marx and the Common: From Capital to the Late Writings. Leiden: 
Brill. 
Benanav, Aaron et al. 2015. “An Identical Abject-Subject?” Endnotes. 4: 276–
301. 
Boltanski, Luc & Ève Chiapello. 2005 [1999]. The New Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. 
Gregory Elliott. London: Verso. 
Brown, Wendy. 2015. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New 
York: Zone Books. 
Budgen, Sebastian. 2000. “A New ‘Spirit of Capitalism’.” New Left Review. 1: 149–
156. 
Carson, Rebecca. 2017. “Fictitious Capital and the Re-Emergence of Personal 
Forms of Domination.” Continental Thought and Theory: A Journal of 
Intellectual Freedom. 1(4): 566–586. 
 24 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 1989. Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal 1890 to 1940.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Chanson, Vincent, Alexis Cukier & Frédéric Monferrand. Eds. 2014. La 
Réification: Histoire et actualité d’un concept critique. Paris: La Dispute. 
Dardot, Pierre et Christian Laval. 2013 [2009]. The New Way of the World: On 
Neoliberal Society. Trans. Gregory Elliott. London: Verso. 
Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of Slums. London: Verso. 
Dean, Jodi. 2016. Crowds and Party. London: Verso. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 1983 [1972]. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem & Helen R. Lane. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Denning, Michael. 2010. “Wageless Life.” New Left Review. 66: 79–97. 
Eagleton, Terry. 2003. Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Esposito, Roberto. 2012. “The Dispositif of the Person.” Law, Culture and the  
Humanities. 8 (1): 17–30. 
Finelli, Roberto. 1987. Astrazione e dialettica dal romanticismo al capitalismo (saggio su 
Marx). Rome: Bulzoni Editore. 
Fischbach, Franck. 2016 [2009]. Sans objet. Capitalisme, subjectivité, aliénation. Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. 
Frankel, Joseph. 2017. “Trump Seems to Support Bush’s AIDS Program for 
Now.” The Atlantic. URL: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/pepfar-global-
gag-rule-trump/515961/ [Last accessed: 8/10/2017]. 
Fraser, Nancy. 2013. Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to 
Neoliberal Crisis. London: Verso. 
Friedrich, Hugo. 1956. Die Struktur der Modernen Lyrik. Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
Friedrich, Hugo. 1974. The Structure of Modern Poetry. Trans. Joachim 
Neugroschel. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University. 
Haines, Christian P. 2017. “The Impersonal Is Political: Adrienne Rich’s The 
Dream Of A Common Language, Feminism, And The Art Of Biopolitics.” 
Cultural Critique. 96: 178–215. 
Hart, Matthew and Alexander Rocca. 2015. “An Interview with Rachel 
Kushner.” Contemporary Literature. 56(2): 192–215. 
Hartley, Daniel. 2017. “Radical Schiller and the Young Marx.” In: Aesthetic Marx. 
Ed. Samir Gandesha & Johan Hartle. London: Bloomsbury. 
Hartley, Daniel. Forthcoming. “Person, Historical Time and the 
Universalisation of Capital.” Salvage. 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Heinrich, Michael. 2012. “Individuum, Personifikation und unpersönliche 
Herrschaft in Marx’ Kritik der politischen Ökonomie.” In Anonyme 
Herrschaft. Zur Struktur moderner Machtverhältnisse. Ed. I. Elbe, S. Ellmers 
& J. Eufinger.  Münster: Verlag Westfälisches Dampfboot. 
Huber, Matthew. 2013. Lifeblood: Oil, Freedom, and the Forces of Capital. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 25 
Jameson, Fredric. 1991. Postmodernism; or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Jameson, Fredric. 2002. A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present. 
London: Verso. 
Jameson. Fredric. 2009. Valences of the Dialectic. London: Verso. 
Jameson, Fredric. 2012. “Antinomies of the Realism-Modernism Debate.” 
Modern Language Quarterly. 73(3): 475–85. 
Jelly-Schapiro, Eli. Forthcoming. “Literature, Theory, and the Temporalities of 
Neoliberalism.” In: Neoliberalism and American Literature. Ed. Stephen 
Shapiro and Liam Kennedy. 
Kushner, Rachel. 2013. The Flamethrowers. Scribner: New York. 
Lukács, Georg. 1971 [1968]. History and Class Consciousness. London: Merlin Press. 
Marx, Karl. 1973 [1857-8]. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 
(Rough Draft), trans. Martin Nicolaus, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Marx, Karl. 1976 [1867]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume One. Trans. 
Ben Fowkes. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
McClanahan, Annie J. 2017. “Becoming Non-Economic: Human Capital 
Theory and Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos.” Theory & Event. 20(2): 
510-519. 
Monferrand, Frédéric. 2017. “Le capital et son monde: contribution à une 
lecture ontologique du Capital.” Revue Période. URL: 
http://revueperiode.net/le-capital-et-son-monde/ [Last accessed: 
9/10/2017]. 
Moore, Jason W. 2015. Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of 
Capital. London: Verso. 
Moore, Jason W. (ed.). 2016. Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the 
Crisis of Capitalism. Oakland: PM Press. 
Naudé, SJ. 2015 [2011]. The Alphabet of Birds. Trans. SJ Naudé. London: And 
Other Stories. 
Postone, Moishe. 1993. Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of 
Marx’s Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Powers, Nina and Alberto Toscano. 2009. “The Philosophy of 
Restoration: Alain Badiou and the Enemies of May.” boundary 2. 36(1): 
27-46. 
Ram, Harsha. 2012. “Futurist Geographies: Uneven Modernities and the 
Struggle for Aesthetic Autonomy: Paris, Italy, Russia, 1909-1914.” In: 
The Oxford Handbook of Global Modernisms. Ed. Mark Wollaeger & Matt 
Eatough. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rancière, Jacques. 1999 [1995]. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Julie 
Rose. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Sastry, Shaunak & Mohan Jyoti Dutta. 2013. “Global Health Interventions and 
the ‘’Common Sense’’ of Neoliberalism: A Dialectical Analysis of 
PEPFAR.” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication. (6)1: 21–
39. 
 26 
Scott, James. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Serfati, Claude. 2017. Le militaire: Une histoire française. Paris: Éditions Amsterdam. 
Sohn-Rethel, Alfred. 1978. Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of 
Epistemology. London: Macmillan. 
Toscano, Albert. 2007. “‘European Nihilism’ and Beyond: Commentary by 
Alberto Toscano.” In: Alain Badiou. The Century. Cambridge: Polity. 
Toscano, Albert. 2008. “The Open Secret of Real Abstraction.” Rethinking 
Marxism. 20(2): 273–287. 
Toscano, Alberto. 2010. “The Politics of Abstraction: Communism and 
Philosophy.” In: The Idea of Communism. Ed. Costas Douzinas & Slazoj 
Žižek. London: Verso. 
Williams, Raymond. 1963 [1958]. Culture and Society: 1780-1950. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. 1995. Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical 
Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
